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INTRODUCTION
The initial phase of the human genome project was completed in 2003, with the sequencing of the human genome. Researchers hope that this sequencing will allow them to develop new drugs and therapies and to identify genetic risk factors for a variety of conditions. At the same time, many fear that the human genome map may open a new frontier for potential discrimination, particularly in insurance. Senators James Jeffords and Tom Daschle stated that "misuse of genetic testing could create a new underclass: the genetically less fortunate" (Jeffords and Daschle, 2001 ). In many countries, an intense legislative and lobbying activity, reminiscent of the debate over access to HIV tests in the 1980s, is taking place that could shape the environment of underwriting in life and health insurance. Consumer groups, fearing discrimination and the creation of a class of uninsurable individuals, want insurers and employers prevented from gaining access to medical information obtained through genetic testing.
In opposition to these views, insurance companies point to the risk of adverse selection. With over 1,000 genetic tests offered, they fear that policyholders may gain a financial advantage through insurance purchase decisions, from genetic information known to them but not revealed to insurers.' Insurers claim that without a level playing field, a death spiral of increasing premiums and decreasing portfolio size may threaten their financial solvency. They emphasize the positive implications of DNA testing for annuitants and the benefits of early diagnosis. They discuss the ethics and inconsistency of prohibiting the use of genetic tests, while allowing other medical tests and family history to be used for underwriting purposes. Both sides, consumer groups and the insurance industry, recognize that the predictive information obtained from genetic tests could be relevant to the actuarial calculations used by insurers in establishing policies and premiums. The issue is whether the use of such information by insurers in underwriting is justified on economic and market grounds to overcome social concerns. Actuaries in the United States voice their concerns through bodies such as the American Academy of Actuaries; by means of Issue Briefs (American Academy of Actuaries, 1998, 2002), articles, and Capitol Hill briefings. Congress is urged to proceed with extreme caution when it considers legislation aimed at preventing genetic discrimination in insurance.
The word "discrimination" is often used neutrally by economists to reflect the ability to distinguish among groups, but the same word is used by the public to reflect socially unfair ways of classifying groups. In the economic sense, is adverse selection a sufficiently plausible threat that discrimination based on genetic test results is justified? On average, in the United States, women live longer than men and Caucasian-Americans live longer than African-Americans. Both of these differences in life expectancy could be used to establish lower term life insurance premiums for women and Caucasian-Americans compared to men and African-Americans. Insurance companies typically charge lower premiums for women than for men, but they do not charge lower premiums for Caucasian-Americans than for African-Americans. This is not because discrimination by sex is actuarially more important than discrimination by race, but because discrimination by race is not socially tolerated. To that end, the use of race as an underwriting factor for insurance is prohibited in all states. In Montana alone, the use of gender in rating for any type of insurance is illegal. If in these cases, failure to discriminate by race or gender led to sufficient adverse selection-for example, if the protected groups overpurchased life insurance as a result, raising premiums to a level that drove the other groups from the market-the balance between socially intolerable discrimination and actuarially fair discrimination might shift in the other direction.
In the debate about whether insurers should be allowed to use genetic testing results in underwriting, the actuarial profession can contribute by designing models to analyze adverse selection and quantify its impact, thereby generating a more informed discussion. Several recent articles have been published, estimating the potential impact of the test for a BRCA1/2 mutation on the term insurance and critical illness markets, and of the test for specific alleles of the ApoE gene that may predispose one to Alzheimer's disease on long-term care insurance (MacDonald and Pritchard, 2000, 2001; MacDonald, Waters, and Wekwete, 2003; Subramanian et al., 1999) . These models all rely on the assumption of inelastic demand. These articles model insurance purchase behavior following a genetic test, but do not account for the fact that policyholders may elect to reduce their coverage following the price increases resulting from adverse selection. This research introduces elastic demand for term insurance into the analysis.
A discrete-state, discrete-time Markov chain is used to follow the evolution of twelve cohorts of women, differentiated by age at issue and family history of breast and ovarian cancer. All women own term insurance at time 0. Policyholders can get tested for BRCA1/2 mutations and, after receiving the test results, either change their face amount or lapse their policy. The adverse selection that results forces the insurer to raise premiums each year. In the model, the firm uses an anticipatory pricing approach, following the theoretical framework of Hoy and Polborn (2000) and MacMinn, Brockett, and Raeburn (2004), which models the adverse selection implications from genetic testing and insurer responses. Here, the insurer considers both the supply and demand sides of the market and sets the price and quantity to be supplied accordingly. Marshall's Law of Demand, resulting in a constant price elasticity of demand, models the reaction of policyholders when confronted with premium changes.
The article proceeds as follows: First, current regulatory and underwriting procedures in various countries are discussed, to illustrate the diversity of country response to insurer use of genetic tests results. The elastic demand Markov model is described next and the estimation procedure for all parameters is described, including the questionnaire used to estimate price and risk elasticities of demand. Results and sensitivity analyses are then presented, followed by our concluding remarks. A combination of the factors listed above may lead to higher expected death benefits;
consequently, the company must raise premiums for the following year. Since the insurer cannot use genetic test results in its pricing, it must continue to price all contracts using family history and thus must increase the premiums in each cohort by the same percentage. Since insurers have access to family history information, each of the twelve cohorts is assumed to constitute a separate rating cell; price increases are calculated for each cell separately. We are not considering any cross-subsidization between cells.
Elastic demand is incorporated into the consumers' demand system. Behavioral changes in benefits as a result of price increases are modeled using Marshall's Law of Demand, linking the price P of an economic good to its quantity sold Q through the relationship: For a woman who gets tested during policy year t, the insurance benefit demanded for year t + 1 is solely influenced by this test result. For each test outcome, the relative degree of change in the woman's known death risk depends on the information known to her prior to testing, specifically her family history. This relative change in risk level then influences the quantity of insurance demanded. This (constant) risk elasticity of demand with respect to health risk, 8, is defined as dQ/ Q dQ= (3) dR/R' where R denotes the woman's family history health risk-her 20-year probability of death given her family history of BC or OC. 6(+) denotes the risk elasticity after the shock of a positive test that doubles the death risk, while 8(_) denotes the risk elasticity after a negative test that halves the death risk.
The insurance benefit demanded in year t + 2 and each year after will be determined using Marshall's Law of Demand with a price elasticity parameter corresponding to the woman's test status, Again, in our model, if a woman gets tested in year t, the insurance decision made for year t + 1 is determined only by her risk elasticity corresponding to the test result; the amount of insurance benefit demanded in t + 1 is not simultaneously affected by her price elasticity of demand. We use this as each woman's decision-making approach; a recently obtained result of a genetic test overwhelmingly affects the woman's thoughts and subsequent insurance strategy; thus we assume that any premium change for year t + 1 would be accepted in full.
In calculating the premium to be charged each year, the insurer begins by estimating the actuarially fair rate, then it adopts a pricing strategy to determine the premium charged. In practice, an insurer may follow a variety of pricing strategies, among which are to simply react to adverse mortality experience by attempting to recoup any past 4 As noted, we use the demand function PXQ = A. At time 0, all women in each cohort choose an initial benefit of $100,000 and their price elasticities are the same. Within each cohort then, the value of A would be the same for all women at time 0. The value of A would vary across the twelve cohorts, corresponding to the different initial premium P. After time 0, the value of A is recalibrated each year to recognize that the actuarially fair price increases each year. In this model, prices are expected to increase each year due to age and adverse selection. A woman is willing to purchase the same level of coverage as the previous year as long as price increases are actuarially fair; however, she will be sensitive to the price increases due to adverse selection. losses or try to anticipate the reactions of policyholders to future price changes and set premiums accordingly. The latter approach is considered here.
Under an anticipatory approach, following the framework of Hoy and Polborn (2000), Villeneuve (2003) , and MacMinn, Brockett, and Raeburn (2004), the insurer incorporates supply considerations into the pricing process. The insurer recognizes that any change in premium will impact the benefit demanded, which will of course determine the expected losses; these expected losses should then drive the premium to be charged. Thus, there is a simultaneous adjustment of price and purchasing. As derived in these articles, the cyclical impact of supply on demand on supply and so forth can lead to an equilibrium whereby the appropriate premium to be charged results in a zero profit/loss for the insurer. Our model follows this approach; the insurer calculates how much to supply at each possible price and then determines the equilibrium premium and quantity to be supplied. Due to the anticipated adverse selection from women undergoing genetic testing and then changing their quantity demanded, the firm will be increasing premiums each year such that the expected loss becomes zero.
This pricing strategy implies that there is no front-loading of premiums whereby a consumer would pay higher than actuarially fair premiums initially. In insurance models by Pauly et al. (2003) and Hendel and Lizzeri (2003), front-loading induces policyholders to remain committed to a particular contract; because of this prepayment, a consumer may not be later on attracted by a cheaper contract in the spot market. Our conservative assumption of no front-loading, which conveys singleperiod decision making by the insurer, will lean in the direction of making adverse selection more likely.
Each year, premiums increase because of (i) increased mortality due to age, and (ii) adverse selection. To identify the increase due to adverse selection alone, it is assumed that policyholders do not reduce their benefits in response to the age-related portion of the most recent price increase; instead, policyholders accept all past price increases and react only to the most current adverse selection premium increase. Sensitivity analyses will be performed on the various parameter estimates to investigate the variability of our results.
PARAMETER ESTIMATION
The model requires the estimation of many parameters. Annual probabilities of death for the different ages at issue, family histories, and test results are required to set premiums and determine expected and observed benefit payouts. These death probabilities were estimated in Lemaire et al. In questions 6-10, a hypothetical situation was presented in which respondents were told their risk of death had doubled after the result of a special blood test. In question 6, the same set of possible life insurance benefit amounts was offered as in question 1, at the same benchmark premiums. Respondents were asked to choose their desired benefit amount given this higher death risk level. In the next four questions, premium schedules were varied in the same way as in questions 2-5; these questions are used to estimate .positive, the price elasticity of demand for term insurance under the high death risk scenario. Questions 11-15, used to estimate Xnegative, followed the same format, but represented a situation in which the death risk was halved after the blood test. Respondents exhibited a high degree of inertia in the presence of a test result that halves the death risk; 71.25 percent did not change their benefit, with little variation across gender. The average benefit change was not significantly different from 0. This emphasizes that, for most people, term insurance is an essential purchase driven by family need; the amount of insurance purchased is fairly independent of the mortality risk and the annual premium. Respondents reacted more to a doubling of the death risk; in this situation, only 48.33 percent did not change their benefits (61.11 percent of males vs. 40.67 percent of females). The average benefit increase was a highly significant $145,600. Males increased their benefit by an average $115,000, females by an average $164,000. is set equal to 0.68. We also expect that while in the untested state, women with different family histories of BC/OC will vary in their responsiveness to price changes. To obtain estimates for the risk elasticity of demand, our attention focuses on an individual's responses to questions 1 and 6, which uses the same premium pricing schedule. Question 1 asked the respondent to indicate the desired level of benefit given current death risk; in question 6, the death risk was hypothesized to be doubled. For each respondent, a risk elasticity of demand is determined by calculating the percentage change in benefit given this doubling of health risk in the question; these individual elasticities are then averaged across all respondents to determine 6(+). An estimate for 6(_) is calculated in a similar manner, using responses to questions 1 and 11. 8(+) and 6(_) are estimated at a 0.9851 increase and a 0.1279 decrease, respectively.
As stated above, the estimate for 6(+) is obtained assuming a death risk increase of 100 percent. The results of a positive test for BRCA1/2 mutations do not imply that the death risk has doubled. Rather, the degree of change in known health risk depends upon the woman's family history and age. Lapse rates that are differentiated according to test results are introduced. LIMRA International (1996) reported average lapse rates for annually renewable term insurance policies of 15 percent during policy year 1, 14.8 percent during year 2, 12.4 percent during years 3-5, 9.4 percent during years 6-10, and 6.5 percent during years 11+. These lapse rates do not vary much by age at issue. With these rates, out of 1,000 issued policies, only 151.75 remained in force after 20 years. To correspond with this figure, for untested women, a constant lapse rate of 13.4 percent is adopted in our model for years 1-5; a rate of 7.5 percent is used for years 6-20. These rates lead to the same total number of lapses as the LIMRA rates. From the questionnaire, it was observed that no respondents selected a $0 benefit after learning of a positive or negative test result. This can be interpreted, for this sample, as the initial purchase of insurance serving to fulfill the need to protect a beneficiary rather than a hedge against future dramatic changes in health. Also, as we noted above, respondents did not change their benefit significantly after a negative test. So, for women who test negative, we expect their purchasing behavior to be similar to those who remain untested; thus, the same constant lapse rates of 13.4 percent during years 1-5 and 7.5 percent during years 6-20 are used. For women who test positive, a primary adverse selection concern, as discussed previously, is that they will lapse at a lower rate than women who test negative or remain untested. Following this, as a conservative approach in our benchmark model, the lapse rate is set at 2 percent for women who test positive, regardless of when in the 20-year period they undergo testing. Our anticipatory pricing approach considers both the supply and demand sides of the market. At the end of each year, the insurer determines how much life insurance policyholders demand at each possible price for the following year. The firm anticipates how the women would change their benefits in response to a price change. The resulting premium and quantity to be supplied would be such that total premiums equal total expected losses in each year. Table 3 summarizes the premium evolution for the cohort of women age 30, 2FDR-BC. It is found that the insurer would increase premiums by 1.2 percent after the first year to meet its expected obligations for the following year. The price increase results from the aggregate effect of women getting tested and changing their insurance benefit, untested women expected to reduce their insurance benefit because of a price increase and women who lapse. After 5 years, the actuarially fair premium increases by 17.5 percent; after 20 years, the cumulative premium increase, which we also interpret as cumulated adverse selection, reaches 44.12 percent. The degree of information provided by the BRCA test for this family history renders this case as one of the worst possible scenarios for potential adverse selection; however, with our benchmark parameter estimates, there is no "adverse selection death spiral." Over time, the adverse selection process tapers off, as the portfolio runs out of insured women available to be tested. After 20 years, 712 policies lapse and 27 policyholders die. The vast majority of these lapses are women who remain untested. For other cohorts, cumulated adverse selection ranges from 0.04 percent (no FH, age 50) to 50.14 percent (1FDR-BC, age 30). The twelve cohorts are then pooled into a single portfolio in which each cohort of age and family history is weighted by its respective likelihood in the population. These weights are determined using observed age at issue of term insurance policies obtained from LIMRA, and probabilities for given family histories derived from fertility rates published by the National Center for Health Statistics (2000). The evolution of premium increases for the portfolio are tracked; these increases are also reported in Table 3 . Aggregating the twelve cohorts into the portfolio, it is observed that the overall cumulative premium increase due to adverse selection reaches 16.22 percent. These required increases would bring the market to equilibrium each year. Despite uncertainties in the estimation of all parameters, it appears likely that adverse selection in term life insurance following a ban on the use of the BRCA1/2 genetic test should not be a major source of concern to insurers.
It is reported earlier in this section

Sensitivity Analysis
To examine the varying degrees of potential adverse selection due to genetic testing for BRCA1/2 mutations, the sensitivity of our results to the behavioral assumptions is now explored. We examine the sensitivity in the age 30, 2FDR-BC case, one that Next, keeping Xuntested at 0.588, the range between Xpositive and Xnegative is expanded by setting these price elasticities equal to 0.00 and 1.00, respectively. Thus, under this scenario, women at a higher than average risk do not reduce their insurance benefit at all in the face of price increases, while women at a lower than average risk react heavily to price changes. We find that the adverse selection cost here reaches 45.73 percent, representing one extreme of behavioral response after genetic testing.
Risk Elasticity
Reiterating how the benefit demanded varies each year in the model, a woman changes the amount of her insurance benefit according to Marshall's Law of Demand, utilizing price elasticity estimates corresponding to her testing status. In the year of testing, a woman changes her insurance benefit solely based upon the risk elasticity of demand corresponding to her testing status. This risk elasticity of demand parameter does not enter into Marshall's Law of Demand because it is initially assumed that the informational impact from a genetic test outweighs any price considerations immediately after testing. As an alternate method of estimating the benefit change after testing, we now use Marshall's Law of Demand in that determination. A woman would increase or decrease the benefit demanded based upon the percentage change in the price.
The new "price" facing the woman would be P/(1 + DR), where DR represents the change in death risk following BRCA1/2 testing. Thus, for a woman who tests positive, the inclusion of DR implies that the "real price," the price relative to her risk level, has fallen; this will lead her to demand a higher insurance benefit for the following year. For a woman who tests negative, this real price would increase, thus leading her to reduce her benefit. Thus, under this approach for determining benefits, for an age 30, 2 FDR-BC woman tests positive in year 1, she would increase her benefit by 22.2 percent; a woman who tests negative would decrease her benefit by 34.5 percent. This approach for determining the benefit change would make the women with stronger family histories of disease more responsive after a negative test. It is observed that the 20-year cumulative premium increase of 46.10 percent, slightly higher than that found in the benchmark model. Over all twelve cohorts, the cumulative increase in this portfolio would be 12.80 percent. Now returning to the benchmark model and its method of determining price changes after testing, we keep all price elasticities at their initial levels and vary the two risk elasticities of demand. Again, these two parameters 3(+) and 6(_) convey the degree of benefit change after a test, which results in doubling or halving the death risk; the initial estimates for these parameters were 0.9851 and 0.1279. 8(+) is varied from 0.50 to 1.00 and S(_) from 0.00 to 0.50. In Figure 2 , the gradual increase in cumulated adverse selection is depicted for the age 30, 2 FDR-BC case; at the lowest pair of risk elasticities, the cumulative premium increase is 38.29 percent, and approaches 48.13 percent in the most risk-sensitive case.
Lapse Rates
To examine the incremental effect of lapsing, all lapse rates were kept at their benchmark levels and all price and risk elasticities were set at zero. In this scenario, women do not change their insurance benefits year to year regardless of testing behavior and price changes; they either remain at $100,000 throughout their insured life or lapse their policies. It is observed that adverse selection from lapsing forces the insurer to institute a 30.49 percent premium increase over 20 years. We then return the price and risk elasticities to their benchmark values and set only the lapse rates after testing to be zero; the lapse rates for untested women remain at the rates estimated from the LIMRA data. So, in this scenario, regardless of whether a woman tests positive or negative, she does not lapse her policy for the rest of the time period. We find that the 20-year adverse selection cost, which would be solely due to the varied price and risk elasticities of demand, is 13.64 percent.
Prior Testing
In the benchmark model, it is assumed that all women in each cohort are untested at time 0. It is conceivable that some women have already undergone BRCA testing prior to seeking life insurance and already would be demanding a higher insurance benefit than what would be demanded in the absence of this knowledge. Indeed, women who have a strong family history of breast or ovarian cancer could undergo such testing and then seek to become insured. To examine the impact of prior testing in our model, it is now assumed that 5 percent of all women have been tested for the BRCA mutation prior to time 0; these women are distributed among the twelve cohorts based upon their testing rate and representation in the population. Across the portfolio, a 20-year cumulative premium increase of 17.66 percent would be experienced. This would represent an increased risk to the insurer given that losses due to adverse selection would be begin at an earlier time. Insurers should consider the evolving rate at which individuals seek to undergo genetic testing.
Recall that in all of these models, a woman who lapses at an intermediate time does not reenter the market; these cohorts are closed. It must be noted that in the actual market, such a woman could purchase another life insurance policy, either from the same insurer or a different firm. The risk level that she would bring to the insurer's existing portfolio could be substantially different from the average risk level in the portfolio. As described in this article, a woman at higher risk is less likely to lapse her policy while lower risk women are more likely to lapse, thus contributing to the adverse selection problem. It is expected then that these reentrants into the market are more likely to be "good" risks, healthier than the average woman of the same age in the portfolio because she has just undergone medical questionnaires and testing at the time of this insurance purchase. Insuring these women would then infuse into the portfolio better risks over time, thus helping to alleviate some of the adverse selection problem. Given that we are not considering these reentrants in our model, this introduces an additional level of conservatism in our estimates.
Our model introduces three sources for adverse selection: differentiated benefits following test results, differentiated lapse rates after testing, and different reactions to price increases. Focusing on the age 30, 2 FDR-BC case, one of the cohorts that has the highest potential for adverse selection, at our benchmark parameter estimates, we calculated cumulated adverse selection costs to be 44.12 percent after 20 years. The impact of differentiated lapsing rates is estimated at 30.49 percent while the impact of price and risk elasticities is found to be 13.64 percent. Given that differentiated reactions following premium increases were found to be negligible, we conclude that adverse selection costs come mainly from benefit changes following the shock of a test and varying lapsing rates after testing. The price elasticity of demand has a minimal impact on adverse selection costs.
CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis, performed with conservative behavioral assumptions, concludes that potential adverse selection due to BRCA1/2 testing may not result in a significant cost to term life insurers, as our benchmark estimate of the cumulative effect of adverse selection after 20 years only amounts to 16.22 percent. This cost is likely to be offset by the overall decrease in mortality rates, and the decline in breast and ovarian cancer mortality due to better prevention, detection, and treatment techniques. . Moreover, all of these studies are based on such extremely conservative assumptions that they probably overstate the costs of adverse selection to some extent.
We conclude that as long as current testing conditions prevail (few highly predictive genetic tests available, low testing rate due to high cost), adverse selection due to genetic testing could be a manageable problem for insurance companies. This conclusion is valid only in the term life insurance market; models to study the impact of genetic testing and adverse selection in health and long term care insurance, which require different inputs on morbidity and treatment, are currently being developed.
This conclusion could change if advances in genetics lead to the development of an inexpensive test that would simultaneously investigate many common genetic diseases. The availability of such a test may be several years away, at best. Indeed, there have been few, if any, major genetic discoveries in the last five years. The 
Survey Questionnaire
After answering questions concerning employment, gender, marital status, years of education completed, number of people depending on their financial support, and annual household income, respondents were requested to imagine that they currently have no personal life insurance, through their employer or otherwise, and that they are contemplating purchasing a ten-year term life policy for themselves. After explanations about the policy, respondents had in question 1 to select one benefit amount and annual premium, given their current health conditions. For the 36-45 age group, premium and benefits are provided in Table Al . In subsequent questions, premiums and health conditions were varied, keeping the same benefit levels.
